This study analyzes the foundations and closures of the total population of Swedish commercial banks in 1831-1990 using both semi-parametric and parametric event-history methods. With reference to the comparatively rigid control of entries and exits in banking, five hypotheses are formulated: (1) acquisitions constitute the principal reason for closure in banking; (2) the early years are less hazardous for banks than for members of other industries; (3) the survival patterns of banks are related to the freedom of banking operations; (4) the survival rates of banks are positively related to the general economic activity at the time of foundation; and (5) the survival rates of banks are negatively related to the degree to which tustomer relationships already exist. The findings support the first, setond, third and fifth hypotheses; some evidente also favours the fourth hypothesis.
Introduction
The population ecology approach to organisation analysis, initially formulated by Aldrich (1979) and Hannan & Freeman (1977) , has attracted increased interest in the last decade.
Researchers within this tradition have investigated how specific populations of organisations have changed over time, focusing on questions related to founding and closure rates. Using historital data they have examined the plausibility of an environmental model for selection in populations of organisations (cf. e.g. Hannan & Freeman, 1988a; Freeman, 198833, Singh, 1990 and Meinhard, 1990) .
In recent years, this perspective has found a runaber of applications particularly in the newspaper industry (Carroll Delacroix, 1982; Delacroix & Carroll, 1983; Carroll, 1984; Amburgey, Lehtisalo & Kelly, 1986 , Carroll, 1987 and Carroll Hannan, 1989 . The study of this industry has an unusual relevante, sinte newspapers constitute such important institutions in modern societies. It is thus tommon to label the Press as the Fourth Branch of Government beside the Legislative, Executive and Judicial Branthes (Siebert, Peterson & Schramm, 1956 ).
Sinte the conditions of the environment constitute a key feature of the population ecology approach, it is clearly advisable to study also populations with other environmental conditions. This has been done with respect to telephone companies (Barnett & Carroll, 1987) and labour unions (Hannan & Freeman, 1988) . The first of these has a particular interest due to its regulated environment. Sinte the population ecology approach focuses on the entries and the exits, industries with regulated environments should be of particular interest. Such industries may be expected to have different founding patterns from industries in unregulated environments. Due to the stress of the liability-ofnewness hypothesis from Stinchcombe (1965) such industries may be expected to have different closure patterns than others. It is therefore fitting, as further studies are undertaken, to choose populations where the foundations and the operations are regulated. In addition it is appropriate to follow the earlier tradition and focus on important institutions in society. Moving then from the Fourth Branch of Government we here suggest that an industry, which on good grounds could be mentioned as the Fifth Branch of Government, the Commercial Banks, should be analyzed by means of the population ecology approach. As Will be shown in Section 2, such companies in a sense constitute semi-publit institutions. As a result they are under careful Government scrutiny: their entry is subjett to formal authorization and their operations are continuously scrutinized. These properties, discussed in Section 2, lead us to five hypotheses concerning survival patterns in banking populations. Section 3 deals with the statistical methodology of the population ecology approach, whereas Section 4 dwells on issues related to data collection.
Section 5 presents the results from a study of the population of Swedish commercial banks, and Section 6 provides the conclusions of the study.
The Survival Characteristics of the Banking Finn

General Characteristics of the Banking Finn
Banks represent important institutions in the modern society in their roles as nodes in finantial networks. They connect those having a surplus of capita1 with those in need of credit, thereby providing liquidity and spreading risks. In addition they hold key positions in domestic monetary policy. A crucial feature for the successful achievement of these tasks is trust. Particularly those depositing their money in the bank need assurance that it Will meet its obligations as regards repayment. If this trust is questioned, there is a danger of a run on the bank, which in due course may spread to other banks and ultimately lead to finantial panic. In order to prevent such events governments tend to have elaborate rules for supervision of the banking industry. First, even in the present time of deregulation, completely free entry is rare. An entering bank needs a charter and to obtain this it must fulfil certain requirements concerning capita1 coverage, etc. In addition some countries, like the United States, have restrictions on geographic (McFadden Att) and product (Glass-Steagall Att) expansion. For banks in operation supervision constitutes an important part of the environment. Banks are expected to operate according to certain rules, thereby running a sound and safe business. In the United States this is even controlled by unannounced dramatic inspections (cf. e.g. Mayer, 1976) .
The described features of banking imply first that there is a preselection of entrants to the industry through the charter procedure. Setond, there are restrictions on risk-taking through the supervision. Both these features are likely to reduce the risk of bank failure.
Hypotheses Concerning Bank Survival Patterns
As a result of these properties in the banking industry we expect survival patterns of banks to have other characteristics than the industries investigated earlier. First, we assume that bank supervision and the efforts to protect the system from distrust Will make liquidations less likely than in other industries. The solution to finantial distress in banking finns Will therefore be the acquisition by another bank rather than liquidation.
Hypothesis 1: Acquisition constitutes the principal reason for closure in the banking industry.
Setond, we expect that the liability-of-newness Will be hampered by the regulatory features. This risk reduction Will operate in two ways: the properties of prospective entrants are screened in order to reduce the risk of introducing too weak members into the bank population, and the regulating bodies usually assess whether the industry would benefit from an additional bank foundation. As a result we expect bank closures to reach a maximum at later than for other industries. The three presented hypotheses all arise from the regulated environment of the banking industry. As discussed above regulation is not the only important property of banks, however. Another is their significant role in the commercial life. This leads us to two additional hypotheses concerning the interaction of banks with their commercial environment. First, we shall argue that banks Will be more sensitive to variations in economic activity than e.g. newspapers. Thus the earlier studies could not confirm a relationship between economic cycles and foundations (cf. e.g. Delacroix & Carroll, 1983 ). Indeed we could argue that economic decline would influence the bank negatively particularly through failures of customers.
Hypothesis 4: The survival rates of banks are positively related to the general economic activity at the time of foundation.
Finally, referring to the importante of tustomer relationships in the banking industry (cf. e.g. Engwall & Johanson, 1990) , we expect that the degree to which other banks are already operating on the market Will influence survival rates. Thus the more banks are already serving a particular market the more difficult it Will be for new entrants to survive. These difficulties Will be the more significant the longer the already established banks have been operating, sinte time Will constitute a crucial factor in developing tustomer relationships.
Hypothesis 5: The survival rates of banks are negatively related to the degree to which tustomer relationships already exist.
The Statisticdl Methodoloqy
The Survival and Hazard Functions
The survival function, S(t) is a fundamental concept in the study of organizational survival data. It is defined as the probability of surviving up to a certain time t. As all organizations are alive at the start of the follow-up period we have S(O) = 1. The function S(t) decreases monotonically and is related to the usual distribution function, F(t), by the relationship S(t) =l-F(t).
Another important but less easily understood concept is that of the hazard function (the hazard rate). It shows the instantaneous closure (death) rate at the time t for an individual alive at this time. The formal definition is
From this it can be inferred that the conditional risk of dying in the short interval (t, t+At) is h(t)At. It should be noticed that the hazard is a rate and not a risk, which means that h(t) can be larger than 1. The hazard is related to the density function f (t) as follows: h(t)=f (tl/ll-F(t) ).
The Problem of Censored Data
In many statistical applications, the normal distribution is used almost routinely. In survival or duration analysis a number of other distributions are also considered in the description and analysis of the data (cf. e.g. Carroll & Delacroix , 1982; Barnett & Carroll, 1987 and Addison & Portugal 1987 If one suspects, as we do in the present study (cf.
Hypothesis 2), that these conditions are not at hand the MakehamGompertz model, however, has one important limitation: it does not allow a non-monotonical hazard. One way to bypass this problem is to assume that the survival-function is time-dependent, for example by allowing the basic distributional parameters to be different for T<tO and 2'%-t0.1 In this way it is possible to handle the situation with a hazard which at first increases and then give an example of this.
decreases. However, the point t0 has to be chosen in some suitable way and the assumption of an abrupt change in parameter values at a certain point bardly seems realistic in practice.
Another alternative is to choose a function which can handle non-monotonical hazards. One such alternative which is very flexible is the extended generalized gamma-distribution (EGG) introduced by Staty (1962) and extended by Prentice (1974 (Kock, 1932, p. 37; Nygren, 1985, pp. 29-34 and Sandberg, 1978, p. 659) or as precursors to the real commercial banks (Thunholm, 1964, p. 42 ). Notwithstanding we decided to exclude the discount offices from the present study, sinte there are some difficulties in obtaining the necessary data. The characteristics of the three types of banks studied are summarized in the Appendix.
As discussed more extensively in Wallerstedt (1991) Needless to say the point made by Young (1988, pp. 7-8) , that a number of borderline cases exist in the definition of foundations and closures, is also relevant for the present study.
Analysis of the data indicates that these cases do not significantly influence the results, however.2
Defining Founding Cohorts
In order to be able to investigate the impact of the changes in the environmental conditions (Hypothesis 3) the population has been divided into five founding cohorts: 1830-1863, 1864-1894, 1895-1918, 1919-1931, 1932-90 . This division is based on the changes in the environmental conditions shown in Table 1. 2For a more profound discussion of this question, cf. Wallerstedt (1991). Source: Fritz (1988) and Larsson (1989) .
The laws enacted up to 1863 gave the prerequisite of the foundation of different kinds of banks. The first law tame in 1824
and regulated the form of charters to be granted for Joint Stock
Banks with Unlimited Liability and also stipulated a ceiling on interest rate charges. Although the Att made no mention of the issue of bank nates the banks granted a charter according to this law immediately started to issue their own paper bills. Finally in 1846 these actions were legally formalized (Sandberg, 1978, pp. 
659-660). Legislation concerning Joint Stock Companies and Branch
Banks was enacted in 1848 and 1851.
In the Bank Reform Att of 1863 the Swedish Parliament decided upon several important changes in the banking system. The former support from the National Bank of Sweden to the Branch Banks, which had been a necessary condition of their existence, ceased.
At the same time, however, a new type of banking Company, Limited Liability Joint Stock Bank Companies without the right to issue bank notes, was introduced. Concerning the banks' interest rate the earlier limitations on changes now tame to an end (Sandberg, 1978, p. 663) . As a matter of fatt Brisman (1934, p. 111) Up until the turn of the century there were still no real obstacles to the founding of new banks. Although a charter was needed for those banks which issued their own bills, there were never really any barriers to entry (Fritz, 1988, p. 13) . During In the subsequent period (1919) (1920) (1921) (1922) (1923) (1924) (1925) (1926) (1927) (1928) (1929) (1930) (1931) measures were taken to prevent the toncentration of banks which had started during the first decade of the century. A law of 1919 stated that mergers between bank companies were not allowed without the permission of the Government and in 1921 the right of the banks to buy shares in other banking companies was restricted (Fritz, 1988, p. 14 and Larsson, 1989, p Unlimited Liability were eliminated (Lindgren, 1987, p. 23 ).
In short the five periods can thus be regarded as a chain of increasing regulation. Before 1900 restrictions on bank foundations and operations were few. With the passage of time they have gradually increased. In the 1980s and early 1990s a shift is taking place towards deregulation. Several of the old restrictions on banking operations (liquidity quotas, interest control, credit limits and currency control) have been removed (cf. Lybeck & Hagerud, 1988, p. 16) . The effect of these changes could not be considered in our analysis, however, sinte they are too recent.
Empirital Results
The complete data-set consists of 176 observations, 11 of which have censored survival times, i.e. they refer to banks which were still operating in June 1990. Investigating the first hypothesis we find in Table 2 that indicate a bank failure. Generally speaking, a merger can result from an explicit strategy of the involved banks, which find that a merger is of advantage in one way or another. A tomparison between the early closure risks in the banking and other industries can be made by using the survival function. We then know that, generally speaking, according to Aldrich (1990, p. 5) about 50 per cent of founded organizations are dissolved within the first two years. The same liability-of-newness has been confirmed by Carroll & Delacroix (1982, p. 174) who found that the probability of survival to the age of two years was below 0.20 for the nineteenth-century Argentinian press. A similar pattern was observed for Irish newspapers although the decline in the early part of the survival curve was less steep, the probability of surviving five years being 50 per cent (ibid., pp. 172-176). If we campare these findings with the survival curve computed by the Kaplan-Meier method for the Swedish banking industry (Fig. 2) we first find that survival times vary between 0 and 157 years. The median survival time is 15 years, and only 25 % of the banks had ceased to exist after nine years. If the characteristics of the population are illustrated by the hazard function (Fig. 3) we do not obtain a curve which is continuously decreasing from the first years and onwards. Instead the hazard increases to reach a maximum after about 10 years. After this point the hazard diminishes continuously. Our data thus seem to support the argument that the charter procedure and the supervision system influence the shape of the hazard function. The latter is not continuously declining as we would expect according to the liability-of-newness hypothesis. From a more general point of view this indicates that the environment, and particularly the legislation determining conditions for entry and operations, are crucial for the survival. 
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When we divide the population into founding cohorts (Table 3) , we find that the life-time varies widely between different cohorts, the median life time ranging between 10 and 37 years. The lowest figure is exhibited by the banks in the large 1895-1918 founding cohort and the highest by the preceding 1864-1894 cohort. This is also in accordance with our expectations, sinte the 1895-1918 period was one in which acquisitions, the main closure method in the industry (cf. above), were facilitated. For this cohort we thus find that 25% of the banks had disappeared after seven years and after another 10 years only 25 % remained.
Hypothesis 3:
The Survival patterns of banks are related to the freedom in banking operation
Fig. 4. Survival Estimates for Different Faunding Cohorts
Cohort 1932-not shown due to few observations.
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Another illustration of the differentes in life-time between the foundinq cohorts is provided by their survival functions (Fig. 4) .
A logrank test (Lawless, 1982, p. 417) gives a X*(4)-value of 37.43, which is strongly significant at all realistic leveis. In addition estimates of the D-parameters and their standard errors using the EGG and Cox models with the cohort 1895-1918 as reference (Table 4) The conclusion which can be drawn from our investigation of hypothesis 3 is thus that the 83 banks belonging to the 1895-1918 cohort had a much shorter life-time than the banks of other cohorts. The main reason seems to be that the legislation aiming to support the toncentration of the banking industry (cf. above Table 1 ) induced this development. Even though bank legislation ought to have had the same effect on all existing banks in this period, the newly founded banks were more likely to be affected by the new laws than their older competitors.
Hypothesis 4: The Survival rates of banks are positively related to the general economic activity at the time of foundation
When dealing with economic activity we are hampered by the lack of data due to the long period that we are covering. If we hypothesize that economic conditions in general should be important, the most obvious measurement which we can consider is the GNP, and more precisely the change in this variable, to avoid the problems caused by the secular growth of variables of this type. Other variable formulations which Capture the economic situation would be possible, e.g. the deviation around a computed trend, but the relative change is easy to understand and its behaviour is The development of GNP is familiar but a few characteristics are given in Table 5 . The most important part of the Table for and Northern Sweden (Norrland, . Obviously the banks located in Stockholm frequently differed from the other banks, insofar as they often aim at a coverage of the whole country rather than just a specific region.
___------___------___~~---_-__~----~-___~~~~~-_~_~-
There are no large obvious differentes in survival between these groups of banks, however (Table 7 ). This is confirmed by an insignificant logrank-statistic, x2 (3)=2.31, p = 0.51 and the estimated parameters shown in Table 8 all of which imply insignificant differentes between the larger regions. In additicn to the effects of region, a possible differente between the three largest Swedish cities, Stockholm, Gcthenburg and Malmo, and the rest of the country has also been tested. The hypothesis of such a differente was firmly rejected. Most of the banks that we consider operate or operated on a market which is limited in geographical size. We adjudged the county to be suitable basic unit in this connection. The fundamental further argument is that a given region cannot support an unlimited number of banks. The actual number depends on the size of the market which obviously can be measured in different ways. We have used the number of inhabitants in the county at the time of foundation of the bank as this measure. The actual variable used is defined as MARKET, which is the number of inhabitants in a specific region divided by the number of banks after a particular foundation. In nvestigating the fifth hypothesis we have also chosen to define :wo more variables ENTRY and TOTAGE. ENTRY is defined as the number of banks in operation in the county where the foundation takes place. In an effort to take into consideration the importante of time as a factor for the creation of tustomer relationships, we have introduced TOTAGE, the total age of the banks in the county at the time of the bank foundation.4 Table 9 and 4The mean age of the banks was found to have a lower explanatory power than TOTAGE and detailed results with this variable are not reported. AS so often, the estimated formal models are easier to interpret than the survival curves (Table 10- In the univariate analyses we earlier found no regional effects and the same is true in multivariate analyses. This variable, therefore, was excluded from the analyses reported in The order of entry into the market IS still important. The relative hazard for the setond bank is 1.54 although insignificant. For the banks with a higher order number than two the relative hazard is higher or 2.14. In the multivariate models, In the univariate analyses we were not able to flnd a significant effect of the ecanomir conaitions at t:h+ ti,me -If foundation as measured by the change in ;NP. II; i.ne rn;it::,::r:ar@ EGG model on the other hand such an effect (p = 3.L23) ens'ies wner the variable GNPR is used. With the Cox model we obtaln a simiiar but slightly weaker effect (p = 0.047). As mentioned above the data set is reduced in models involving GNP. Nevertheless, the estimates do not change much between models (1) and (3) which indicates that the model used is fairly robust with respect to the exact choice of data set.
Conclusions
The major argument for studying banks from an ecological point of view which was mentioned by way of introduction was that they are highly regulated in terms of foundations, operations and closures.
Our analysis has provided evidente showing that these particular In further research it would be interesting to extend the analysis to allow for time-dependent explanatory variables.
Although leading to considerable complications such an approach might give useful results. There is one particular tontext where this is the case. The effect of the economic conditions in general could be modelled by including a time dependent variable which reflects changes in economic conditions confronting the bank during the whole period of its existence and not just at the time of foundation. This is a major complication and it remains to be seen whether it is possible to carry through. A simplification of this general approach would be to study the effect of specific events such as the First World War and its immediate aftermath.
APPENDIX. THREE TYPES OF SWEDISH BANKING FIRMS.
As mentioned in Section 4.1 there are three different sets of banks in the population: joint stock banks with unlimited liability (enskilda sedelutuivande banker), branch banks (filialbanker) and joint stock bank companies (bankaktiebolaq).
This appendix provides some background information on these three types of banks.
A.l. Joint Stock Banks with lJnlimited Liability
Through a Royal Proclamation in 1824 it was made possible to start private banks (enskilda banker) in Sweden. In the beginning these were characterized by their owners having a joint liability for the bank's undertakings. These private banks were not supposed to issue their own paper money (bills). The first commercial bank, Skariska Privatbanken founded in 1831, however, immediately issued such bills. As the authorities did not explicitly object, this right was legalized in 1846.
The charters for the joint stock banks with unlimited liability were granted for ten years at a time, and the last bank with the right to issue its own bills, Norrbottens Enskilda Bank, was chartered in 1893. Around the turn of the century the charters for this type of bank tame to an end and from then on no issuing of bills was allowed.
The joint stock banks with unlimited liability never became popular. One reason for this unpopularity was their right to issue bills of their own, leading to an over-abundante of different kinds of bills circulating in the country. Another important reason was that the amount of money for borrowing was rarely in a proper proportion to the number of available paper bills in the region. A further reason was the rumour that they made unreasonably high profits (Rosenberg, 1878, pp. 69-70 and Sandberg, 1978, pp. 659-660) .
A.2. Branch Banks
The above mentioned criticism against the joint stock banks with unlimited liability was the ultimate reason for the establishment of branch banks. They were privately owned provincial banks, without the right to issue bills. They were closely connected to the Central Bank of Sweden, which provided them with the necessary paper bills, all of the same kind. The intention was that they would replace the joint stock banks with unlimited liability. This did not happen, however, sinte the Swedish Parliament in its session 1862-63 decided to forbid the Central Bank of Sweden to use their funds for the benefit of branch banks (Rosenberg, 1878, p. 76 and Sandberg, 1978, p. 662) .
A.3. Joint Stock Bank Companies
When the branch banks had been rejected by the Swedish Parliament interest arose in finding an alternative form. The joint stock bank companies were then chartered on the basis of an Att from 1848 about limited companies. The main differentes between them and the first category of banks (cf. above) were that they were not allowed to issue bills and that the owners had a limited responsibility. At the beginning the joint stock bank companies
were not supposed to be commercial banks in the proper sense of the word. The oldest such bank, Skandinaviska Kreditaktiebolaget in Gothenburg, for instance, was planned to be a finante Company on a foreign pattern, with the pure aim to attract capita1 for industry (Rosenberg, 1878, pp. 144-145) . Several of the later joint stock bank companies had the same characteristic.
The Swedish commercial banks to-day are all joint stock bank companies. Gradually they have added the services, which are currently considered to be provided by the modern bank (Ekonomiskt ABC, 1985) : instruments of credit, receiving money on deposit, money-lending business, payment agency, foreign banking activities, stockbroker activities, and other activities on the capita1 market such as for instance trustee activities. The forerunners of the commercial banks of today, however, only in different degrees executed these kind of activities.
